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NEPA: WAITING FOR THE OTHER SHOE TO DROP
KENNETH E. GRAY*
In 1974, Hugh G. Yarrington wrote an article entitled "Judicial
Review of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Generation of
Cases Under the National Environmental Policy Act."' In that article
Yarrington noted:
[Als the procedural aspects of Section 102 become more and more
settled by the voluminous case law on the subject, environmental liti-
gants have turned to Section 101 of the Act in an effort to insure
compliance with both the letter and the spirit of NEPA. Some stu-
dents of the act believe that this shift in emphasis in NEPA litigation
is terribly significant, and, in fact, presages a second generation of
NEPA cases, concerned not with procedure, but rather with enforce-
ment of the substantive environmental policies enunciated in Section
101. At present, it is too early to predict whether the trend toward
reliance on Section 101 will significantly broaden the scope of the
Act; however, it is possible, depending upon the judicial interpreta-
tion given Section 101, that we are indeed on the threshhold of a
second generation of NEPA cases, and that it will be more significant
than the first.
2
The second generation of NEPA cases heralded by Yarrington has
not arrived. Instead, NEPA is in danger of becoming a dead letter stat-
ute, at least as far as its ability to generate substantive benefits for the
environment is concerned. It is hoped that the following evaluation of
NEPA (especially in light of the ominous Vermont Yankee 3 decision)
will help to avert the dismemberment of NEPA or NEPA's substantive
goals currently in the works. This article will chiefly concern itself with
an intriguing feature of NEPA that is also its weakest point: the role
substantive standards and substantive judicial review play in NEPA's
operation.
Evaluations of NEPA differ. In his 1977 Environmental Message,
* Professor, Duquesne University School of Law; B.A., lona College, New Rochelle, N.Y.;
J.D., M.P.A., Harvard University.
1. 19 S.D.L. REV. 279 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Yarrington]. See also Wharton, Judicially
Enforceable Substantive Rights Under NEPA4, 10 S.F.L. REV. 415 (1975-76).
The National Environmental Policy Act [hereinafter referred to as NEPAl is codified at 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
2. Yarrington, supra note 1, at 280-81.
3. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978). See text accompanying notes 88-89 infra.
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President Carter has praised NEPA's accomplishments. The Council
on Environmental Quality4 has cited widespread support for NEPA ex-
pressed at public hearings held by the Council in 1977.5 On the other
hand, H. Paul Friesma and Paul J. Culhane have quoted one environ-
mental lawyer who has charged that environmental impact statements
6
are "squandering massive amounts of time, talent, public and private
moneys," "have little relationship to actual decision making on loca-
tion, design, construction, and operation of the endeavor being stud-
ied" and "[oiften . . .are done after basic development decisions have
been made."' 7 Richard A. Liroff has quoted Congressman Dingell to
the effect that "maybe we are breeding a race of environmental impact
writers whose responsibility is less an honest evaluation of the environ-
mental impact than it is sort of a medieval exorcist approach to the
environment. . . by setting forth certain facts in certain forms, regard-
less of what the real facts may be." 8 Other observers have noted that
whatever the effects of NEPA, its advent has been accompanied by "a
proliferation of environmentally-oriented legal firms."9 It is within this
climate of disagreement about NEPA that decisions concerning sub-
stantive review by the courts of environmental impact statements and
substantive standards will be made.
THE PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Mindful of the treacherous path whereby one distinguishes proce-
dure and substance,' 0 it seems safe to say that virtually all judicial
opinions reviewing the environmental impact statement process so far
have dealt exclusively with procedural questions. As Richard N.L. An-
drews has pointed out, the federal agencies have followed suit:
It is not too strong to say that the attention of virtually all federal
agencies, from the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) on
4. Hereinafter referred to as CEQ.
5. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1977, EIGHTH
ANNUAL REPORT 116-17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Eighth Annual Report].
6. Hereinafter referred to as EIS's.
7. Friesma & Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics, and the Environmental Impact Statement
Process, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 339, 339 (1976) (quoting R. Hansen, Speech to the Colorado
Open Spaces Council, Aspen, July, 1974).
8. R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH
99 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Liroffl.
9. Dreyfus & Ingram, The National Environmental Policy Act. 4 View of Intent and Practice,
16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 243, 257 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Dreyfus & Ingram]. See also COUN-
CIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF
SIX YEARS' EXPERIENCE BY SEVENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES 11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CEQ
Report], where CEQ recommends that the agencies increase the training programs devoted to
preparation of impact statements.
10. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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down, has been directed almost exclusively to the procedural imple-
mentation of §102(2)(C), which required the preparation of detailed
statements. The guidelines of the CEQ have been directed solely to
the preparation of these detailed statements; not until the 1973 revi-
sion was there even an explicit reminder that the statements were
intended to insure implementation of the policy goals of §101 rather
than serving as ends in themselves.1"
The major procedural issues addressed by the courts, commenta-
tors, and CEQ regulators include:
1. the threshold questions-whether a statement must be
prepared or not, and if not, whether some shorter document
must be prepared;12
2. the delegation questions-who prepares the state-
ments; 13
3. the timing questions-when in the process must the
statements be prepared;'
4
4. the adequacy of the statement-its quality and under-
standability, "consideration" of all alternatives, and its use of
cost-benefit analysis;15 and
5. the necessity and extent of "consultation" with other
concerned agencies and with the public through some form of
11. Andrews, NEPA in Practice: Environmental Policy or Administrative Reform? 6 ENVT'L L.
REP. 50,001, 50,001 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Andrews]. See also Andrews, Agency Responses to
NEPA: A Comparison and Implications, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 301, 302 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Andrews-Agency Responses]. CEQ guidelines are still the same. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500. See
also Cortner, A Case Analysis o/Policy Implementation. The National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 323, 327 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cortner]; Wichelman, Adminis-
trative Agency Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 A Conceptual
Framework/or Explaining Differential Response, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 263 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Wichelman]. Wichelman discusses the four stages of compliance among different agen-
cies he has studied.
12. See Rosen, Cost-Beneft Analysis, Judicial Review, and the National Environmental Policy
Act, 7 ENVT'L L. 363, 365-66 n.ll (1977) [hereinafter cited as Rosen]. Retroactivity, or the
"grandfather" problem, has also arisen in some cases. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Calloway, 499 F.2d
982, 988 (5th Cir. 1974). On whether NEPA applies overseas, see Bethell, Exporting Pettfoggery,
HARPER'S 34 (Oct. 1978).
13. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); amendments to NEPA provided by Pub. L. No. 94-83, Aug. 9,
1975, § 89 Stat. 424. See also Druley, FederalAgency NEPA Procedures, ENVT'L REP. No. 23, at
9-11 (July 9, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Druley].
14. See Aberdeen & R.R.R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289 (1975), and CEQ's 1976 "Memo-
randum" concerning this case, set forth in Druley, supra note 13, at Appendix C, 19-23; Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) on program statements; and Scientists Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v.
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Druley, supra note 13, at 16-18, also
discussed the two document EIS procedures (draft and final EIS). See also Koshland, The Scope
ofthe Program EIS Requirement: The Needfor a Coherent Judicial Approach, 30 STAN. L. REV.
767 (1978).
15. Most NEPA cases involve some or all of these questions. For an exhaustive considera-
tion of these and other issues, see Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973),
rev'd in part, Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
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public participation in the EIS process.' 6
One would expect that these procedural questions will diminish in
both quantity and importance over time. Once agencies recognize the
courts' resolution that agencies examine the impact statement process
and comply faithfully with the relevant regulations and court-imposed
technicalities, agency compliance undoubtedly will reduce complaints
about procedural defects in agency preparation of EIS's.
Additional factors certain to push toward making EIS's procedur-
ally acceptable and immune from traditional attack strategies are the
growth of talented multi-disciplined environmental departments or di-
visions in many agencies whose main job is to prepare the statements
and the simultaneous growth of high-priced consultants, who often ac-
tually prepare the EIS's.' 7 The March 1976 CEQ report on environ-
mental impact statements noted that "[miost major federal agencies
have established special high-level offices to oversee and help imple-
ment agency responsibilities under NEPA."' 8 The report further re-
commended that:
[H]igh-level NEPA offices, fully staffed to help agency leaders use
the environmental analyses and procedures required by NEPA as an
effective management tool, are essential to NEPA's success. Each
agency should periodically evaluate how its NEPA office works and
how it can be strengthened to carry out its NEPA responsibilities. 19
Therefore, logic as well as prognostication seem to indicate that a
"second generation" of NEPA decisions will focus on whether and to
what extent NEPA mandates specific substantive results. In one way or
another, the critical issues coming up will cluster about the central
question of the role of the courts in substantive review of agency deci-
sions or substantive rule making under NEPA. Remarkably, as matters
now stand, the relevant criteria necessary to make intelligent decisions
in these areas have been badly neglected or do not exist. The distinct
prospect, therefore, is that the environmental goals of this legislation
will be jettisoned for irrelevant reasons.
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW-THE CASES
In its eighth annual report on environmental quality the CEQ
16. CEQ regulations require hearings even though NEPA itself does not. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.7(d). Druley, supra note 13, at 16-17, discusses the hearing and inter-agency procedures.
See also Liroff, supra note 8, at 86-89, and Cortner, supra note 1i, at 332, for a general discussion
on a number of these matters. For a review of EIS's by CEQ and EPA see text accompanying
notes 45-48 infra.
17. See Druley, supra note 13, at 9.
18. CEQ Report, supra note 9, at 5.
19. Id. at 11.
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boasted that "both federal and state courts have moved from insistence
on adherence to NEPA's procedures (section 102(2)) to implementation
of NEPA's substance (sections 101, 102(1)). The courts are emphasiz-
ing the need for better actions rather than simply requiring better envi-
ronmental impact statements." 20 In contrast to this view, however, the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits con-
sistently have held that NEPA creates procedural rights only and that
NEPA's goals are fulfilled when the required procedures are fol-
lowed.2' It is no surprise that these two circuits cover areas of the coun-
try opposed to conservation since the days of Theodore Roosevelt and
Gifford Pinchot. Furthermore, what the CEQ report fails to mention is
that even where substantive review is theoretically available in the
courts, no court has yet halted or reversed an agency project on the
grounds that the agency decision itself, in light of the EIS, was substan-
tively incorrect or represented an error in agency judgment or failure to
carry out NEPA's substantive environmental goals. 22 As Richard An-
drews has stated:
Great scrutiny has been devoted to whether or not impact statements
discuss every category of impact that might be considered significant;
but no action has yet been rejected because it failed to "approach the
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources," or because it
failed to promote the achievement of NEPA's other stated goals and
objectives. The fascination of both administrative agencies and
courts with NEPA's procedural requirements has so far neglected, if
not obscured, the policy purposes which the procedures were in-
tended to serve. 23
Since there appears to be a significant divergence of viewpoints
among the circuits on the question of substantive review, a comparison
of the opposing views is instructive. Representative of the Ninth Cir-
cuit viewpoint is Trout Unlimited v. Morton,2 4 the famous Teton Dam
20. Eighth Annual Report, supra note 5, at 121. See cases cited in the Eighth Annual Report
at 121 n.378. See also the cases cited in Rosen, supra note 12, at 368 n.22.
21. Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir.
1974); Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974). See National Helium Corp. v.
Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1006 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Upper Pecos Ass'n
v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 406 U.S. 944 (1972), vacated and
remanded to determine mootness, 409 U.S. 1021 (1972).
22. See Concerned Residents v. Grant, 388 F. Supp. 394, 410 (M.D. Pa. 1975), vacatedinpart
on other grounds, 537 F.2d 29 (3rd Cir. 1976); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Callaway, 382 F.
Supp. 610, 622 n.38 (D.D.C. 1974). To the effect that there have been no cases which overturn an
agency decision based on a proposal's cost-benefit balance see Comment, The Role ofthe Courts
Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 300, 320 (1973); Note, The
Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 HARV. L. REV. 735,
747 (1975).
23. Andrews, supra note 1i, at 50,007.
24. 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974) (action to enjoin construction of Teton Dam; EIS held
sufficient).
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case,25 in which the court of appeals stated that NEPA "is essentially a
procedural statute" 26 and that:
Its purpose is to assure that, by following the procedures that it
prescribes, agencies will be fully aware of the impact of their deci-
sions when they make them. The procedures required by NEPA...
are designed to secure the accomplishment of the vital purpose of
NEPA. That result can be achieved only if the prescribed procedures
are faithfully followed; grudging pro forma compliance will not do.
We think that the courts will better perform their necessarily limited
role in enforcing NEPA if they apply § 706(2)(D) in reviewing envi-
ronmental impact statements for compliance with NEPA.
27
Representative of the viewpoint that allows substantive review is
the Gillam Dam case, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Engineers,28 in which the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
stated that "[g]iven an agency obligation to carry out the substantive
requirements of the Act, we believe that courts have an obligation to
review substantive agency decisions on the merits." 29
Unfortunately, neither point of view has been adequately devel-
25. In that case the EIS was upheld and the project shortly thereafter caused a tragic disaster.
26. 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (citations omitted).
27. Id.
28. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972) (citation omitted) (action to enjoin completion of flood con-
trol project based on insufficient EIS dismissed).
29. Id. at 297-98 (footnotes omitted). The court continued:
Whether we look to common law or the Administrative Procedure Act, absent legis-
lative guidance as to reviewability, an administrative determination affecting legal rights
is reviewable unless some special reason appears for not reviewing. Here, important
legal rights are affected. NEPA is silent as to judicial review, and no special reasons
appear for not reviewing the decision of the agency. To the contrary, the prospect of
substantive review should improve the quality of agency decisions and should make it
more likely that the broad purposes of NEPA will be realized.
The conclusion we reach with respect to substantive review of agency decisions is
supported by the District of Columbia Circuit, the Second Circuit and the Fourth Cir-
cuit, and by the analogous decision of the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 136 (1971).
The commentators appear to prefer the Eighth Circuit's approach of allowing substantive
review. For example, according to one commentator, "Notwithstanding the controversy over the
question of substantive review of agency compliance with the policies of NEPA set forth in Sec-
tion 101, it would appear that the better reasoned cases hold that such review should be avail-
able." Yarrington, supra note 1, at 293. A second commentator has stated:
This interpretation is certainly the better view. Those courts that recognize only proce-
dural duties seem to dismiss as mere rhetoric the entire section of the act that declares a
national environmental policy. It is unreasonable to maintain that Congress would have
enacted such a policy without establishing an effective means of effectuating it.
Note, Program Environmental Impact Statements.- Review and Remedies, 75 MICH. L. REV. 107,
127 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Program EIS's]. See also DiMento, Citizen Environmental Litiga-
tion and the Administrative Process.- Empirical Findings, Remaining Issues and a Directionfor Fu-
ture Research, 77 DUKE L. REV. 409, 423-25 (1977). But see Comment, Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act Through Rulemaking The Implications of Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 148, 177-79 (1976-77) [herein-
after cited as Implementing NEPAl, where the author is one of the few who criticizes "second-
guessing" agency decisions. The Comment remarkably anticipates some of the feelings ultimately
expressed in Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
NEPA
oped or supported. Neither opinion set forth above is supported by
comprehensive analysis or compelling reasons. For example, the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund court upheld the substantive decision reached
in that case by the Corps of Engineers, but failed to explain logically
why even though there are substantive goals broadly enunciated in
NEPA, these goals are within the province of the courts to help deter-
mine. It is just as reasonable to have a system whereby the administra-
tive branch regulates itself through the impact statement process, but
where the process, while allowing public and legislative input, is closed
to judicial intervention in policy-making decisions. 30 The Environmen-
tal Defense Fund case and concurring majority cases seem finally to be
grounded simply on the "presumption" of reviewability noted by Da-
vis31 and referred to by the Eighth Circuit. 32
One perceptive critic seems to suggest that the procedure-sub-
stance distinction is not really meaningful anyway since "all questions
of NEPA compliance may be characterized as procedural." 33 Blurring
the distinction might give reviewing courts a tool for significant super-
vision of agency decisions in environmental areas, by encouraging de
novo review of all, not just some, agency decisions. 34 But it may be
that increasing agency sophistication, plus the United States Supreme
Court attitude expressed in Vermont Yankee35 toward excruciating pro-
cedural requirements imposed by the courts, will prevent environmen-
tally beneficial development along these lines. This strategy has been
criticized on other grounds as well.
36
30. Such an environmental impact statement system, closed to substantive judicial review,
appears to have been adopted in Australia. See Whalan, The Structure and Nature of.4ustralian
Environmental Law, 8 FED. L. REV. 294 (1976-77). The avenues of administrative accountability
in a parliamentary system are different, of course, and the United States is in an era where over-
sight of the agencies exercised by the executive branch has and will create serious political
problems. President Nixon justified Watergate and other horrors, reportedly, on his inability to
effectively control the federal bureaucracy. The recently enacted "regulatory-calendar," see
ENVT'L REP. 1211 (Oct. 27, 1978), creates constitutional questions similar to those raised during
the Nixon administration over impoundment. See Cutler, Who Masters the Regulators, THE
WASHINGTON POST A17 (Oct. 17, 1978).
31. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 510-11 (3rd ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Davis],
which relies in turn on the Administrative Procedure Act, §§ 701, 704.
32. 470 F.2d at 298.
33. Leed, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Is the Fact ofCompliance A Proce-
dural or Substantive Question? 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 303, 314 (1974-75) [hereinafter cited as
Leed].
34. Leed commented that "[tlreating section 101(b) and 102(l) compliance as a procedural
question could give a court at least as much room to consider fact issues as would the substantive
review approach, since in rendering decisions involving NEPA, courts have tended to conduct de
novo review of procedural questions." Leed, supra note 33, at 322.
35. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See text accompanying notes 88-89 infra.
36. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 50,007; Andrews-Agency Responses, supra note 11, at
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As to inter-agency review of EIS's by the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality, Hannah J. Cortner has summarized CEQ's problems by
stating:
CEQ's oversight role is limited because it does not have authority to
veto actions of agencies or compel adoption of its guidelines. It does
not have sufficient staff to review EIS's. It has also been criticized for
failing to devise objectives and guidelines for developing impact as-
sessment methods. Unable to sanction agencies for noncompliance,
CEQ has relied upon environmental litigants and the courts to ac-
complish what it could not. As the courts have handed down strin-
gent rules, CEQ has incorporated them into its revised guidelines. 37
EPA review of draft statements, mandated by section 309 of the
Clean Air Act,38 and carried out under a rating system, appears subject
to similar criticism. Even the 1976 CEQ report on impact statements
concedes that EPA review is often ineffective. 39 EPA's attitude toward
the Act has even been described as hostile.4°
What criteria should be used to decide whether and to what extent
substantive review of agency decisions, where EIS's are required, is
permitted? Traditionally, questions of statutory interpretation have
been resolved by examining the legislative intent or purpose behind the
statute, and by evaluating the probable consequences or impacts of al-
ternative decisions.
NEPA's legislative history is inconclusive, to say the least. 4' For
example, consider the compromise worked out between Senators
Henry Jackson (D. Wash.) and Ed Muskie (D. Me.) prior to NEPA's
passage. The requirement of a formal "finding" with respect to envi-
ronmental impacts was changed to a "detailed statement" by a respon-
sible official. Consultation with environmental agencies and public
disclosure also were mandated. Logically, dropping the requirement of
37. See Cortner, supra note 1 1, at 327 (footnotes omitted).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1976).
39. CEQ Report, supra note 9, at 40. See also Trubek, Allocating the Burden ofEnvironmental
Uncertainty. The NRC Interprets NEPA "s Substantive Mandate, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 747 (dealing
with intra-agency review, a subject little explored given our usual preoccupation with the activities
of courts). See also Wichelman, supra note i1, at 291 n.14.
40. MacBeth, The National Environmental Policy Act After Five Years, 2 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L.
1, 14 (1975-76).
41. As Dreyfus and Ingram have stated:
Since NEPA was enacted, endless hours in intellectual effort have been invested by
solicitors of federal agencies, nonfederal litigants and potential litigants, and judges and
their law clerks in trying to divine the intent of Congress from the sketchy documenta-
tion of legislative history. The pursuit of "congressional intent," however seriously it
may be approached, has been about as scientific as the voodoo practice of reading the
future in a random pile of chicken bones.
Clearly, no one can say except a presiding judge-and that because of authority
rather than special insight-what the intent of Congress was with respect to Section 102.
Dreyfus & Ingram, supra note 9, at 254.
NEPA
a "finding" suggests a desire to make the statements non-reviewable.
Nonetheless, Robert Lirofi's description of the compromise points to
the opposite conclusion. Liroff sees the basic difference between the
two men as one of disagreement as to the fundamental conduct of envi-
ronmental policy. According to Liroff:
Senator Jackson's view was that with enactment of NEPA, mission-
oriented public works agencies would internalize environmental val-
ues as they began to develop evaluations of projects' environmental
impacts. But Senator Muskie and the Public Works Committee staff
harbored grave misgivings about the self-enforcement qualities of
NEPA's action-forcing provisions. They believed that some form of
external policing mechanism was needed; the mission-oriented agen-
cies could not be trusted to consider seriously the environmental con-
sequences of their actions and the requirement for environmental
findings provided but the narrowest basis for outside review. In Sen-
ator Muskie's view, external policing could be provided by federal
water and air pollution control agencies, for whose reviews provision
had to be made.
42
Because judicial review never appears to have been seriously deliber-
ated, the courts must decide what Congress would have intended if it
had thought about the problem.
43
THE IMPACT OF NEPA
To determine the potential effect of extensive substantive review
by the courts, or whether such review or other reforms are desirable,
one first must know what the effects of NEPA have been to date. Court
and agency enamoration with procedures and the development of pro-
fessional EIS preparers already have been noted. Getting some idea of
just what "good" NEPA has done is another matter. Commentators
have stated that NEPA's widespread impact statement process "is one
of the most remarkable but, in the literature of political science and
public administration, unremarked developments in recent years." 44
The truth seems to be that while there have been a few case studies and
some intuitive projections regarding NEPA's impact, no one really
knows, certainly not in any detailed or rigorous way, what the accom-
plishments or failures of NEPA have been or why they have occurred.
There are two broad categories of NEPA effects that should be
considered: NEPA's organizational impact on the federal agencies and
42. See Liroff, supra note 8, at 18-19.
43. Id. at 31-32.
44. Dreyfus & Ingram, supra note 9, at 261 (quoting Wandesforde-Smith, Schwartz & John-
ston, Policy Impact Analysis and Environmental Management- Review and Comment, 3 POLICY
STUDIES J. (1975)).
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its effect on the environment itself. The two categories are not, of
course, completely separable.
Organizational Impact
The Council on Environmental Quality's report on environmental
impact statements optimistically maintains that "[e]nvironmental as-
sessments and impact statements have substantially improved govern-
ment decisions over the past six years,' 45 and that better decision-
making has led to improved environmental planning and manage-
ment.4 6 CEQ has also expressed a positive attitude regarding the de-
lays and costs47 generated by environmental impact statements. CEQ's
Eighth Annual Report is equally optimistic about NEPA.
48
Others have not been as sanguine. Professor Caldwell has pointed
out that a person's point of view largely depends on his view toward
environmental protection and the proper government role. According
to Professor Caldwell:
From the viewpoint of tradition-minded engineers, fiscal officers,
lawyers, and mission-directed administrators, NEPA has been effec-
tive in generating costly delays, mountains of paper work, and irre-
sponsible interference in agency business. Ecologically-oriented
citizens, on the other hand, have seen the Act as a Magna Carta of
environmental protection and a cornerstone of a new era in the re-
sponsible exercise of public power.49
Allan F. Wichelman has described a four stage process of agency
compliance with NEPA that demonstrates that the impact of NEPA
has at least been different upon different agencies.50 Wichelman con-
45. CEQ Report, supra note 9, at 2. The report concludes by recommending the "use of
incentive awards as well as meritorious service awards and other employee benefits to recognize
individuals who have dealt with environmental problems in a significant and helpful manner."
Id. at 26. But see Id. at 52 where CEQ admits to some analytical inadequacies. These problems
will evaporate, no doubt, with enlarged professional staffs. See text accompanying notes 17-18
.rupra.
46. Id. at 35.
47. Id. at 43.
48. Eighth Annual Report, supra note 5, at 116-17. This Report states:
The National Environmental Policy Act received strong support and direction from
the new Administration. In his Environmental Message, President Carter said that
NEPA's effect had been dramatic and beneficial in the 7 years since its passage, but he
also emphasized the need to reduce the paperwork and increase the usefulness of envi-
ronmental impact statements. In a new Executive order he directed CEQ to issue regula-
tions, binding on all federal agencies, to implement NEPA and guide the EIS
process .... Until now, agencies have developed their EIS procedures in accordance
with CEQ guidelines ... issued under an earlier Executive order. The regulations are
expected to be a refined, improved, uniform, and legally binding step forward from the
guidelines.
49. Caldwell, The National Environmental Policy Act." Retrospect and Prospect, 6 ENVT'L L.
REP. 50,030 (1976). See also Dreyfus & Ingram, supra note 9, at 260.
50. Wichelman, supra note 11, at 263-67.
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tends that even where agency compliance appears to be pro forma, in
spite of generating a voluminous and impressively comprehensive EIS,
there is gradually effected a "subtle but pervasive integration of envi-
ronmental values into many of the agencies' routine decision-making
activities."' I Wichelman views continued oversight, by courts or other-
wise, as important.
5 2
Most judicial activists probably assume that judicial over-
sight-insistence on complying with proper procedure-while it may
create problems, is in the long run marginally beneficial. Eugene
Bardach and Lucian Pugliaresi, 53 make the provocative and disturbing
contention that judicial intervention in the NEPA-EIS process actually
has been dysfunctional. Basing their arguments in large part on per-
sonal experience as EIS writers, the authors first note the staggering
costs of the statements. For example, the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment's agreement to prepare 212 EIS's in connection with capital in-
vestments in rangelands will cost in excess of $100 million (ten times
the annual budget for the investments themselves during an average
year in the early 1970's). Second, the authors question whether there is
a "normative conception of 'policy analysis' against which the EIS con-
tribution can be measured."
54
Bardach and Pugliaresi concede that Congress wanted the agen-
cies to take a "hard look" at environmental consequences. But the au-
thors argue that what the agencies are actually doing in preparing the
statements is essentially a "defensive" activity. That is, environmental-
ists are charged with being more interested in making a record for a
possible legal case than in making a constructive contribution to the
process. Thus, the agencies fill EIS's with bulk, "because sheer size is a
way of trying to convince courts and other onlookers that the EIS proc-
51. Id. at 279.
52. Hannah Conner dissents. According to Conner:
[T]he GAO reviewed the efforts of seven agencies and concluded that agency implemen-
tation was neither systematic nor uniform. The EIS was not being utilized as an integral
component of these agencies' decisionmaking processes. The GAO also evaluated the
adequacy of six selected EIS's and found insufficient attention to environmental impacts
and alternatives and to comments of reviewing agencies, which limited the usefulness of
the EIS in an agency decisionmaking.
Review of EIS's by Leonard Ortolano and William Hill, a study team at the Univer-
sity of Colorado, and Gordon A. Enk substantiate the GAO findings. Impact statements,
they found, were generally inadequate, prepared as project justifications rather than
decisionmaking instruments, and prepared at a stage at which it was difficult to modify
or reverse plans.
Cortner, supra note I1, at 324 (footnotes omitted).
53. Bardach & Pugliaresi, The Environmental-Impact Statement v. The Real World, 49 PuB.
INTEREST 22 (1977).
54. Id. at 24 n.2.
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ess is being taken seriously." 55 Critical issues may not only be ob-
scured, they may be missed altogether. Bardach and Pugliaresi
contend that rather than realism about environmental impacts, the
process promotes undue pessimism. A direct incentive is also created
to avoid discussion or adoption of possible mitigation measures.56
Bardach and Pugliaresi conclude that serious consideration should be
given to immunizing agencies from most legal proceedings. Bardach
and Pugliaresi believe that "without the constant threat of legal pro-
ceedings hovering in the background, the public debate over the state-
ment's contents would be more intelligent, more candid, and more
honorable, as would be the contents of the statement itself."57
Even Professor Sax's landmark article The (Unhappy) Truth About
NEPA45 8 was not this bleak. While decrying, from personal experience
with the airport expansion program, the notion of the "redemptive
quality of procedural reform,' 59 Sax did not contend that mitigation
measures will be positively impeded.
60
Richard Andrews has categorized and discussed a number of bur-
dens NEPA has imposed on the administrative process, 6I but regarding
the main culprits of NEPA's opponents-cost, delay and
paperwork-apparently no one has come up with hard figures on the
subject. Moreover, on the question of what effect NEPA, or NEPA's
concomitant court supervision, has had on the administrative decision-
making process, evaluations differ widely, with the suggestion now be-
55. Id.
56. Bardach and Pugliaresi state:
The technicians who work on the EIS have neither the access to analytical resources nor
the bureaucratic standing to promote mitigating measures that might usefully be incor-
porated into the project design. This is the price of protecting them-and their legally
reviewable work product-from real and imagined bureaucratic contamination.
Id. at 35.
57. Id. at 37.
58. 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973).
59. Id. at 239.
60. Sax posited five rules of bureaucratic behavior:
1. Don't expect hired experts to undermine their employers.
2. Don't expect people to believe legislative declarations of policy. The practical work-
ing rule is that what the legislature will fund is what the legislature's policy is.
3. Don't expect agencies to abandon their traditional friends.
4. Expect agencies to back up their subordinates and professional colleagues.
5. Expect agencies to o for the least risky option (where risk means chance of failing to
perform their mission).
Id. at 248. Sax concluded:
If we want them to change their behavior, we must give them signals that will regis-
ter. . . . Until we are ready to face these hard realities, we can expect laws like NEPA to
produce little except fodder for law review writers and contracts for that newest of
growth industries, environmental consulting.
Id.
61. Andrews, supra note 11, at 50,006-07.
NL'PA
ing voiced that court review has had a detrimental effect in terms of




In spite of unknown administrative costs or inefficiency, the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act still might be judged successful if,
overall, it has produced significant benefits to the environment. Unfor-
tunately, there seems to be no present way of gauging NEPA's success,
either in an absolute sense of measurable concrete benefits, or in the
comparative sense of weighing administrative and other costs against
environmental benefits. The Council on Environmental Quality admit-
ted in its 1976 report that, with respect to litigation over EIS's, "in no
case was the agency precluded from proceeding with its project or pro-
gram after it complied with NEPA."63 As to projects modified or aban-
doned because of the EIS process, or uncompleted litigation, or the
threat thereof, there is little useful data.64 For example, in his study of
early Corps of Engineers and Soil Conservation Service responses to
NEPA, Richard Andrews concluded "that few substantive changes in
proposed water projects were made by either agency as a direct conse-
quence of NEPA.
65
Changes in priorities that did occur came, according to Andrews,
chiefly as a result of outside "political" pressures. In other words,
changes occurred only because the impact statement process alerted
agency directors, other agencies, environmental groups and the public
about proposed actions. Hannah Cortner has concluded that "[w]hile
NEPA may affect the details of a project, it is unlikely to reverse pro-
ject plans or result in major modifications of agency programs, even
though they cause environmental disruption."
66
Perhaps the most somber support for this skeptical view of NEPA
can be found in the April 1978 study by William W. Hill and Leonard
62. Accord Liroff, supra note 8, at 84, 91-92.
63. Eighth Annual Report, supra note 5, at 32.
64. See Eighth Annual Report, supra note 5, at 129, Table 26.
65. Andrews-Agency Responses, supra note 1I, at 313. Andrews also stated:
In the case of the Corps, survey responses in late 1971 indicated that less than one-fifth of
the projects for which impact statements had been prepared (six per cent of authorized
projects) had been affected in any substantive way as a result of NEPA. In more than 60
per cent of these cases the effect was listed as postponement rather than cancellation or
significant change. Similar survey responses from SCS indicated substantive effects on
approximately six per cent of its authorized watershed planning processes. In two-thirds
of these cases the effect was identified simply as a postponement.
d.
66. Cortner, supra note 11, at 325. Even the mitigation theory itself is brought into question
by the Bardach and Pugliaresi study. See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
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Ortolano.67 This study, funded by the Department of Interior, was
based not on mere speculation, which unfortunately dominates the
early literature, but on a detailed set of questionnaires and empirical
data. Hill and Ortolano concentrated on the effective consideration of
"alternatives" by the Corps of Engineers and the Soil Conservation
Service. The study concluded that while agency personnel give lip
service to the language in the regulations about consideration of alter-
natives, the actual results are largely influenced by the detailed regula-
tions. In fact, changes in planning brought about by NEPA were said
to "have largely been what we would call cosmetic-that is, project
modifications and mitigation measures added to protect or enhance the
environment."
68
CEQ's own report on environmental impact statements was more
candid than it may have realized when it casually admitted that
NEPA's influence on federal decision-making "cannot be measured
precisely. '69 In fact, CEQ conceded that:
It was not always possible to determine precisely when, why,
and by whom a decision was made-whether, for example, an im-
portant environmental decision was made by middle-level officials
on the basis of a preliminary environmental assessment or whether
the decision might still have been the same in the absence of
NEPA.
70
Apparently there is an absence of data regarding: (1) NEPA's
costs; (2) NEPA's effect on the decision-making process; and (3)
NEPA's production of environmental benefits. The effects of court re-
view, court-required procedures and agency regulations on cost, deci-
sion-making and production of environmental benefits also remain
unknown and unstudied.
It is incredible that these issues have not been addressed, particu-
larly where proposals are blithely made or endorsed to extend judicial
review to include genuine substantive review of agency decision-mak-
67. Hill & Ortolano, NEPA s Effect on the Consideration of Alternatives. A Crucial Test, 18
NAT. RESOURCES J. 285 (1978). The study is based on data that is already a few years out of date.
68. Id. at 308. Hill and Ortolano argued that:
NEPA was ... intended to be more than a full disclosure law. It was intended to do
more than insure that environmental considerations were brought in at the end of plan-
ning to minimize adverse environmental impacts of (already planned) projects. Rather,
NEPA was intended to force federal agencies to consider environmental factors equally
with economic and technical factors in their planning and decision making processes. If
NEPA is to accomplish this end it is necessary that environmental considerations be
integrated into planning starting at the earliest possible point in the process.
Id. at 309-10. Hill and Ortolano concluded that "[b]ased on our expectations as to what NEPA
should accomplish with respect to the consideration of alternatives, we would have to conclude
that NEPA has not been very effective." Id.
69. CEQ Report, supra note 9, at 21.
70. Id.
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ing.71 The argument seems to be that if judicially imposed procedural
compliance is a good thing, then judicially imposed substantive compli-
ance will be a better thing. The trouble is that no one knows whether,
or in what ways, the first premise is correct. With over eight thousand
EIS's already accumulated, some answers to these questions should be
available. Environmentalists should be particularly concerned because
an argument solidly grounded upon positive answers to the above
questions would be more likely to persuade a court, or Congress, espe-
cially in a time of severe budgetary cutbacks. Absent some positive
answers, substantive review or other reform may be lost by default,
thereby locking in an expensive, unnatural system of paperwork that
few apparently find satisfactory.
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
If no directly relevant criteria are developed for deciding where
substantive review of impact statements goes from here, a decision,
when it comes, probably will be made on the basis of secondary crite-
ria. Perhaps the most obvious and troublesome question is whether, as
a matter of sound public policy, the courts ought to be deeply involved
in the administrative, "fourth branch" process, and whether the courts
really are capable of being so involved. There seems to be no logically
compelling reason to insist that they should not be involved, if time and
resources are otherwise available, even though this is a role in which
courts traditionally have not been immersed.
Indeed, a persuasive argument could be mounted in favor of judi-
cial oversight of administrative judgment and policy. Where agency
decisions have become pervasive in society and affect the interests of
almost every citizen at one time or another, the need for fairness, ac-
countability, and oversight becomes crucial. With the present limits on
oversight by the executive branch,72 and the inherent weaknesses in
congressional oversight, 73 the courts might well be needed, more than
in the past, to serve as impartial guardians of the public interest.
74
While federal judges sit for life, they are, nevertheless, politically re-
sponsive. As Judge Oakes reminds us, the courts do still follow the
71. See Robie, Recognition of Substantive Rights under NEPA, 7 NAT. RESOURCES L. 387,
422 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Robie].
72. See note 30 supra.
73. See Liroff, supra note 8, at 139. With the demise of the two political parties, interest
group politics has become ferocious in recent years, with the "public interest" forced to take an
even more remote "back seat" position.
74. For a good current call to reexamine the notion of "public interest" see Peters, The Solu-
tion: A Rebirth of Patriotism, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY (Oct. 1978).
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election returns. 75 Moreover, as Judge Oakes has stated:
Judicial review of a vigorous nature may in some ways make envi-
ronmental decisions, more, rather than less, responsive to the public
will. The process of review provides several additional levels of give-
and-take on questions of great public moment. If a substantive deci-
sion of the EPA Administrator were allowed to stand unchallenged,
for example, we would have much less assurance of its wisdom, in-
cluding its political wisdom, than we do in a system that permits at
least one and quite often two levels of appeal. The resulting scrutiny
by the parties and the courts could even affect the initial decision:
aware of what his decision must withstand, the Administrator will
make certain that it is as wise as possible and will take care to articu-
late his reasoning in terms that make the decisions as defensible as
possible. 7
6
Of course, decisions requiring impact statements often involve
broad policy and planning questions, choices and prognostications
about the future, government expenditures and various proprietary ac-
tivities. Such decisions do not easily fit into our traditional fact-finding
adjudicatory model of judicial functioning. Courts are uncomfortable
with these decisions, not simply because "uncertainty" is involved,
77
but because the courts are thrust into a role traditionally considered
policy-making or political. As Professor Sax has pointed out, "It is vir-
tually unheard of for a court to rule directly that a policy is illegal
because it is unwise. . . .-78 Whether this should continue to be so is a
matter that should at least be rethought, especially in view of the pres-
ent popular distrust of bureaucracy, and the helplessness of those con-
fronted with the influence of powerful interest groups. Courts should
not be so wedded to the past that they reject out of hand a limited role
of partner in the administrative process.
79
Whether the courts are capable of intelligently reviewing decisions
75. See Oakes, The Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 498, 515 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Oakes]; Oakes, Substantive Judicial Review in EnvironmentalLaw, 7 ENVT'L L.
REP. 50,029, 50,032 (1977). In both articles, Judge Oakes quotes Mr. Dooley's famous comment
that "th' supreme coort foolows th' illiction returns."
76. Oakes, supra note 75, at 515-16. Judge Oakes also noted that "[P]erhaps the greatest
strength of substantive judicial review lies in its inherently limited nature: it is simply one part of
an ongoing political process in which all sides can seek to influence ultimate outcomes through a
multiplicity of channels." Id. at 516.
77. See Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental
Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 372 (1974-75).
78. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REV. 471, 558 (1970).
79. This is not to say that problems of court congestion and expertise in scientific matters are
not significant, but they might be avoided by resorting to a National Court of Appeals proposed in
the last few years, or by creation of a special court to solely review agency decisions (like the
Court of Claims or the Tax Court). But see REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTIVE THROUGH THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYS-
TEM (1973), which recommends against such a system.
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involving technical scientific data is another question that must be
faced. One would like to think that this question was implicitly dis-
posed of by Justice Frankfurter in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB 80
in his discussion of congressional intent in establishing judicial review
of NLRB decisions. In that opinion Justice Frankfurter stated:
It is fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood. And
it expressed its mood not merely by oratory but by legislation. As
legislation that mood must be respected, even though it can only
serve as a standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid rules
assuring sameness of application. Enforcement of such broad stand-
ards implies subtlety of mind and solidity of judgment. But it is not
for us to question that Congress may assume such qualities in the
federal judiciary.8'
However, a serious debate on this question has been engaged in by
Judges Leventhal and Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
82
Judge Leventhal takes a moderate position, suggesting that the
courts should establish a zone of reasonableness, or non-arbitrariness,
and that this requires some delving into technical issues, with or with-
out aid of special expert assistants. 83 Judge Bazelon's position, on the
other hand, is that judges generally are not in a position to delve into
the technological aspects of most environmental decisions. Instead,
Judge Bazelon would "go further in requiring the agency to establish a
decision-making process adequate to protect the interests of all 'con-
sumers' of the natural environment. ' 84 Moreover, according to Judge
Bazelon, if a result is disliked, procedural deficiencies can be found to
reverse it. In fact, however, Judge Bazelon really chooses to duck the
80. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
81. Id. at 487.
82. See Leventhal, Environmental Decision Making and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 509 (1973-74); Bazelon, Coping with Technology through the Legal Process, 62 CORN. L. REV.
817 (1976-77); Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976);
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
83. Judge Skelly Wright, also of the District of Columbia Circuit, while generally allied with
Leventhal, has seemed enthusiastic about imposing greater procedural requirements upon the "in-
formal" rulemaking process (§ 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976)),
and he has equated the informal rulemaking process with the impact statement process. See
Skelly Wright, New Judicial Requisitesfor Informal Rulemaking. Implicationsfor the Environmen-
tal Impact Statement Process, 29 AD. L. REV. 59 (1977). If this idea were carried to its logical
extreme a perfect circle would occur because all EIS's would require rulemaking, and rulemaking
would require an EIS.
84. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring). In this opinion Judge Bazelon (concurring in the result) would have reversed an EPA
decision because of failure to provide for cross-examination. Leventhal, for the majority, chose to
reverse EPA on the basis of a "substantive standard," ie., the inordinate risk to the economy if
EPA were wrong balanced against slight advantages if they were right in not delaying auto emis-
sion standards for one year.
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substantive issues by falling back on the presumption that correct, or at
least exhaustive, procedures will produce correct results.
In National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,85 Judge Bazelon reversed the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission's grant of an operating license for a nuclear reactor, imposing
additional "procedural" requirements on the informal rulemaking
process. Further, in Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
86
Judge Bazelon reversed a grant of construction permits for two nuclear
reactors because the EIS failed to consider alternative measures to re-
duce consumer demand for power (obviously outside the agency's abil-
ity to implement), and because a report relied on by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission relied too much on technical jargon.
87
These two companion decisions, National Resources Defense, Inc.
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission, recently were dramatically reversed by the United
States Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. 88 In this decision, Justice Rhen-
quist, writing for the majority, was highly critical of the approach taken
by the District of Columbia Circuit. He suggested that the second part
of Bazelon's strategy, i e., imposing elaborate procedures upon environ-
mental decision-making as a conscious substitute for substantive re-
view, will be severely limited in the future. If this is so, then the
question of substantive review will have to be faced squarely. The
Supreme Court's vigorous opinion may be in large part due to their
dismay at finding that the licenses or permits in question had been lan-
guishing for almost ten years because of interminable administrative
proceedings and litigation.
Even if one rejects Judge Bazelon's view of judicial competence to
deal with technical scientific questions, Justice Rhenquist's dicta may
make the question moot with respect to review of EIS's. Nonetheless,
the door might still be open a small crack for substantive review, de-
pending perhaps upon the standard or scope of review to be employed
by the courts.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
The substantive scope of review to be applied by courts in review-
ing environmental impact statements has been the subject of much dis-
85. 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
86. 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
87. Id. at 631.
88. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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cussion by courts and commentators.8 9 The generally accepted test,
where substantive review is said to exist, has combined the "arbitrary
and capricious" 90 standard, authoritatively adopted by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in EnvironmentalDefense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers,9' with the "searching and careful inquiry"
standard enunciated in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Vo/pe. 9 2
Other tests have limited applicability. The "substantial evidence" test
applies only where an adjudicatory or rulemaking hearing has been
held.93 A "rule of reason" standard of review is only applicable where
the review is solely to determine compliance with NEPA procedures. 94
The fascination with these standards is hard to explain since no agency
decisions ever have actually been reversed under any substantive stan-
dard for review of EIS's. In addition, subtle differences among verbal
formulae probably do not make much practical difference anyway. 95
Much attention also has been given to the question of considera-
tion of "alternatives" in the environmental impact statement.96 Ver-
mont Yankee has of course added to this debate.97 Where courts have
required exhaustive "consideration," agencies have supplied the stud-
ies. Forcing exhaustive review, or consideration, of remote alternatives
89. On the issue of overruling the Commission's decision on procedural grounds, Justice
Rhenquist was clear. He stated:
[NIothing in the APA, NEPA, the circumstances of this case, the nature of the issues
being considered, past agency practice, or the statutory mandate under which the Com-
mission operates permitted the court to review and overturn the rulemaking proceeding
on the basis of the procedural devices employed (or not employed) by the Commission
so long as the Commission employed at least the statutory minima, a matter about which
there is no doubt in this case.
Id. at 548. Regarding the consideration of alternatives in the EIS, Justice Rhenquist further
stated:
Common sense also teaches us that the "detailed statement of alternatives" cannot be
found wanting simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device and
thought conceivable by the mind of man. Time and resources are simply too limited to
hold that an impact statement fails because the agency failed to ferret out every possible
alternative, regardless of how uncommon or unknown that alternative may have been at
the time the project was approved.
Id. at 55 1. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also was severely reprimanded for revers-
ing the Commission because one report was not couched in language understandable to a layman.
90. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
91. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). Whether the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is broader
or narrower than a "clear error of judgment" standard (also suggested in Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers) or the "abuse of discretion" standard has provoked some discussion.
See Rosen, supra note 12, at 370 n.34.
92. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
93. § 557(2)(E) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976).
94. See Program EIS's, supra note 29, at 123.
95. See Friendly, "Some Kind of a Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1974).
96. See Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review under NEPA, 88
HARv. L. REV. 735 (1974-75). See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d
827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
97. See note 89 supra.
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through the impact statement process clearly seems to be a procedural
device employed by the courts premised upon the assumption that if
the agency decision-maker is forced to consider all aspects of the prob-
lem he will come up with the right decision, or at least a decision to
which the courts must defer. Therefore, the EIS merely becomes evi-
dence of adequate consideration of environmental factors in the agency
decision-making process and nothing more.
Because of the concentration on scope of review and consideration
of alternatives, a critical role that the EIS might be better suited to
serve has been largely overlooked and little explored.98 That role is
simply one of explanation. Rather than demonstrating that an agency
considered relevant environmental impacts, an obligation all too easy
to evade in fact if not in appearance, the EIS should explain and justify
the decision made, at least in terms of its environmental impacts, to a
reviewing court. Verbal formulae about scope of review need not be-
come terribly significant here because the courts typically would not be
dealing with questions involving the credibility of witnesses. 99 On the
contrary, the court would be addressing broad policy issues.
The extent to which these matters are left to agency discretion
poses another problem. As Professor Davis has pointed out, this de-
pends upon how important the courts view the conflicting rights in-
volved. 00 NEPA itself suggests that some presumption favoring the
environment and environmental interests ought to be adopted.' 0 ' Per-
haps the courts simply should satisfy themselves that the decision is a
"reasonable" one, reasonableness thereby becoming a question of law.
One serious flaw in a suggestion that the EIS might serve princi-
pally as an explanation of agency action, a flaw perhaps curable only
by Congress, is the fact that generally the EIS is not the document used
in agency proceedings for decision-making. 02 Nor is it thought to be
98. But see the articles by Judges Oakes and Leventhal, supra note 82.
99. See Judge Frank's concurring opinion of remand in NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp.,
190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951). See also Judge Skelly Wright's opinion in Amoco Oil Co. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 722, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974), wherein he states:
Where, by contrast the regulations turn on choices of policy, on an assessment of
risks, or onpredictions dealing with matters on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, we
will demand adequate reasons and explanations, but not "findings" of the sort familiar
from the world of adjudications.
100. Davis, supra note 31, at 514-15.
101. Robie, supra note 71, at 411.
102. Nuclear Regulatory Commission procedures provide the contrary. See 10 C.F.R.
§§ 5 1.20(b), 51.23(c).
Final CEQ Regulations published on November 29, 1978 (43 Fed. Reg. 55,978-56,007 (1978))
make what appear to be significant changes. Section 1505.2 of the new regulations provides:
At the time of its decision (§ 1506.10) or, if appropriate, its recommendation to Con-
gress, each agency shall prepare a concise public record of decision. The record, which
may be integrated into any other record prepared by the agency, including that required
NEPA
capable of bearing the full weight of the decision-making process. '0 3 It
does not typically contain agency findings and conclusions, nor does it
necessarily constitute the administrative record. If courts are to involve
themselves regularly in broad agency policy-making, thought should be
given to "cleaning up" the record of such decision-making so that
agency actions will be explained in a concise written set of documents
or a single document that realistically permits scrutiny by non-techni-
cally trained judges. There is no theoretical reason why the EIS could
not become an essential component in such a reform process.
CONCLUSION
It is ironic that a statute "designed to break the incremental deci-
sion chain that too often results in irreversible commitments with unex-
pected effects on the environment," ' 4 nevertheless has concretized an
incremental process effectively subject to no broad substantive stand-
ards, mired in procedure, and generally inapplicable to programmatic
or early stage planning where it might have had some constructive ef-
fects. As has been observed, "[niot only have relatively few impact
statements been done on programs and policies, but the treatment of
important policy issues has in general been judged a weakness of
NEPA's implementation."'
10 5
by OMB Circular A-95 (Revised), part I, sections 6 (c) and (d), and part II, section 5
(b)(4), shall:
(a) State what the decision was.
(b) Identify all alternatives considered by the agency in reaching its decision, spec-
ifying the alternative or alternatives which were considered to be environmentally
preferable. An agency may discuss preferences among alternatives based on rele-
vant factors including economic and technical considerations and agency statutory
missions. An agency shall identify and discuss all such factors including any essen-
tial considerations of national policy which were balanced by the agency in making
its decision and state how those considerations entered into its decision.
(c) State whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm
from the alternative selected have been adopted, and if not, why they were not. A
monitoring and enforcement program shall be adopted and summarized where ap-
plicable for any mitigation.
Whether CEQ has the authority to impose such a regulation, and whether the courts will use
it is yet to be determined. The new Regulations make a number of other changes, including
provisions for:
1. Reducing the length of EIS's (§ 1502.7);
2. Emphasizing real alternatives;
3. Using an early "scoping" process;
4. Using plain language (§ 1502.8);
5. Reducing delay and paperwork;
6. Insuring follow-up on agency decisions.
All the changes are "procedural" in nature, alas. There is considerable doubt whether there will
be a reduction in delay or man-hours, or better results.
103. Accord Dreyfus & Ingram, supra note 9, at 260; Cortner, supra note 1l, at 324; Leed,
supra note 33, at 316.
104. Implementing NEPA, supra note 29, at 184.
105. Miller, Anderson & Liroff, The National Entironmental Policy Act and Agency Policy
Making. Neither Paper Tiger nor Straitfacket, 6 ENVT'L L. REP. 50,020, 50,027 (1976).
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Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, including
the language in Vermont Yankee 0 6 may bolster the resistance to apply-
ing the EIS process at a stage early enough in agency planning to do
some good. Nonetheless, the problems involved in judicial mastery of
technical scientific data do not seem insurmountable. 107
At present the following choices appear to be available:
1. no substantive review at all;
2. continued lip service to the existence of substantive review
without actually engaging in it;
3. vigorous substantive review designed to force substantive
agency rulemaking or regulations; 10 8 or
4. restrained substantive review until such time as agencies
develop rules or regulations.
Unfortunately, without persuasive data from scholars, environmental-
ists, lawyers and students of government setting forth what has been
accomplished or is expected to be accomplished, there is no satisfactory
way of making an intelligent choice among these or other options.
106. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978). See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra. See also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390 (1976); Aberdeen & R.R.R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
107. See note 79 supra.
108. Andrews, supra note 1I, at 50,008, appears to opt for this choice.
